Kautz's Attack on Jerusalem Plank Road, June 9, 1864
Through May into June 1864, the Army of the Potomac commanded by Maj. Gen. George Meade and directed by Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had fought and bled its way south of the Rapidan River through four major engagements -- Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna, Totopotomoy Creek -- to the crossroads of Cold Harbor, barely ten miles from the Capital of the Confederacy. Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had parried every flanking movement but at a terrible price and had drawn reinforcements from the Valley, North Carolina, and from the troops keeping Butler's Army of the James penned into its fortified enclave at Bermuda Hundred.
General Grant, too, had called in his supports, primarily stripping the defenses of Washington of the large Heavy Artillery regiments that had manned the big guns there. Reaching Cold Harbor, Grant then called on one of Butler's two army corps At Bermuda Hundred, the Eighteenth, commanded by Maj. Gen. William Farrar "Baldy" Smith, to board steamers, sail to the White House Landing on the Pamunkey River and march overland to join the fighting at Cold Harbor. It was a logistical nightmare, but Smith arrived with his command relatively intact (sans rations and ammunition) on June 2d and went into line of battle in time for the army's assault on June 3rd. As history records, it was a decided repulse.
During the week following the 3d, Grant contemplated his next moves. Beginning the night of June 12-13, after extensive preparations, he would disengage from his five-mile long line at Cold Harbor and march the army south to James River where engineers were gathering enough pontoon boats to build a very long bridge. General Smith's corps was to return to Bermuda Hundred via the arduous route they had previously traveled.
General Grant, too, had called in his supports, primarily stripping the defenses of Washington of the large Heavy Artillery regiments that had manned the big guns there. Reaching Cold Harbor, Grant then called on one of Butler's two army corps At Bermuda Hundred, the Eighteenth, commanded by Maj. Gen. William Farrar "Baldy" Smith, to board steamers, sail to the White House Landing on the Pamunkey River and march overland to join the fighting at Cold Harbor. It was a logistical nightmare, but Smith arrived with his command relatively intact (sans rations and ammunition) on June 2d and went into line of battle in time for the army's assault on June 3rd. As history records, it was a decided repulse.
During the week following the 3d, Grant contemplated his next moves. Beginning the night of June 12-13, after extensive preparations, he would disengage from his five-mile long line at Cold Harbor and march the army south to James River where engineers were gathering enough pontoon boats to build a very long bridge. General Smith's corps was to return to Bermuda Hundred via the arduous route they had previously traveled.
In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler was left with a diminished force, facing diminished defenders at Bermuda Hundred. So far as could be seen at the time, the confrontation on the Cold Harbor front had stalemated. It is proffered that Butler thought to upstage Grant and launch a coup-de-main against Petersburg. A more generous interpretation is that he was informed or suspected the coming James River crossing and sought to distract attention from what was a hazardous military maneuver. (Butler's chief engineer, Godfrey Weitzel, reconnoitering a location for the James River pontoon bridge.) The intent of Butler's expedition was limited to destroying the railroad bridge over the Appomattox -- a vital Confederate link -- and burn whatever military stores were encountered. He did not intend to occupy the city.
On June 8, Butler directed Tenth Corps commander Maj. Gen. Quincy Gilmore to demonstrate against Petersburg with about 3,500 infantry and 1,300 cavalrymen. If the opportunity presented itself, he was to push his way into the city and do what damage he could do. Pre-dawn June 9, Gillmore's infantry crossed the Appomattox River on a pontoon bridge from Bermuda Hundred and marched south on the River Road. Hink's Division composed of United States Colored Troops regiments advanced from their City Point garrison on the Jordan Point Road and deployed to the right of Gillmore. The infantry mostly were in position at an early hour. The cavalry under Brig. Gen. August Valentine Kautz had crossed the same Appomattox River pontoon bridge but had to make a five-mile detour over uncertain roads to reach the Jerusalem Plank Road in order to approach the city from the south at a pre-arranged time. In the Civil War a converging attack of three columns was difficult to coordinate -- columns were out of sight and touch with one another, time tables disrupted. Officers' confidence swiftly eroded into hesitation and confusion.
The immediate defense of Petersburg's Dimmock Line was in the hands of former Virginia governor Brig. Gen. Henry Wise with barely 1,500 soldiers, artillerists, and a few hundred local militias to cover a large perimeter. Wise had advance notice of the Federal approach. Scouts reported the sound of horses, cannon, and foot soldiers crossing the pontoon bridge. The church bells of the city rang to gather the militia. Wise deployed mixed troops spread thinly in the defenses covering the River, City Point, and Jordan Point roads, the obvious intended targets of any raid. In this scenario, Kautz's circuitous attack from the south made sense -- as a surprise incursion.
Introduce the fog of battle. Hinks advanced his division to test the Confederate defenses, skirmished, and found them daunting. Gillmore, knowing that Bermuda Hundred was lightly defended and that his troops were far from support, thought it best to hold the River and City Point roads and await developments. He waited for the sound of Kautz's surprise attack as a signal to push forward. Kautz for his part waited for the sound of the infantry assault to make his move. Distance, silence, and hesitation prevailed.
Ultimately, Kautz attacked the defenses without outside assurance, found them poorly manned by city militia, and pushed through to near the Petersburg Waterworks. At that moment, Confederate reinforcements arrived, some by rail, a battery, then a regiment of cavalry dispatched by Department commander Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard. Hearing nothing from Gillmore and not knowing what he was facing, Kautz wisely withdrew. Gillmore and Hinks for their part seemed never to have heard Kautz's fight and assumed the surprise had fizzled and began to withdraw.
For the City of Petersburg the battle of June 9th was a great victory by the "old men and boys" who made up the city's militia. This skirmish displaying both courage and confusion was just the stumbling beginning of what would become with the arrival of the Army of the Potomac on June 15, a prolonged siege, a battle in slow motion, lasting some 292 days.
Brig. Gen. August Valentine Kautz
Born January 5, 1828, in Germany Died Sept. 5, 1895, in Seattle Buried Arlington National Cemetery Sect. 2, 992 c. 1832 Family emigrated to Brown County, Ohio 1846 Private in 1st Ohio Infantry, Mexican-American War 1852 Graduated U.S. Military Academy 1852 Served in Indian Wars in Pacific Northwest May 1861Commissioned captain 6th US Cavalry Sept. 1862 Appointed colonel 2nd Ohio Cavalry 1863 Pursuit and Capture of John Hunt Morgan Apr. 1864-Mar. 1865 Commanded cavalry division, Army of the James Mar. 1865 Commanded division, Twenty-Fifth Corps Apr. - May 1865 Member of Military Commission during trial of the Lincoln assassination conspirators 1891 Retired Regular Army as brigadier-general |