Key Documents of the Development of the Siege of Petersburg, compiled by Philip Shiman, edited by David Lowe
Ad Hoc Works & the Use of Regular Approaches, June-July 1864
[Report of N. Michler, 20 Oct. 1864, OR 40, pt. 1, 291.]
“During the month of July the officers of engineers were principally occupied in superintending the various operations of their profession, such as the preparation of siege material, the construction of redoubts, batteries, parallels, and boyeaux, together with conducting the necessary surveys, and preparing complete plans and maps of the environs of the city and its approaches incident to offensive movements against the fortified position taken up by the enemy in front of Petersburg. No regular siege was intended, as it would be impossible, with the small army brought before it, to invest it completely. The lineal contour is too great to attempt to cut off all communications with the town, or to prevent re-enforcements being thrown into it. To take the place some favorable position must be selected at which to assault the works and burst through and occupy the interior, and to accomplish this a preponderance of metal must be brought to bear against the immediate point of attack to silence the enemy's guns, and to open the way for an attacking column specially chosen for the occasion. The new era in field-works has so changed their character as in fact to render them almost as strong as permanent ones, and the facility with which new and successive lines of works can be constructed (so well proven throughout the whole campaign just terminated) renders it almost useless to attempt a regular siege. The open assault of works is attended with immense loss of life, but at the same time during the slow operations of the siege the sharpshooter so effectually does his work as to produce a large bill of mortality.”
[Report of N. Michler, 20 Oct. 1864, OR 40, pt. 1, 291.]
“During the month of July the officers of engineers were principally occupied in superintending the various operations of their profession, such as the preparation of siege material, the construction of redoubts, batteries, parallels, and boyeaux, together with conducting the necessary surveys, and preparing complete plans and maps of the environs of the city and its approaches incident to offensive movements against the fortified position taken up by the enemy in front of Petersburg. No regular siege was intended, as it would be impossible, with the small army brought before it, to invest it completely. The lineal contour is too great to attempt to cut off all communications with the town, or to prevent re-enforcements being thrown into it. To take the place some favorable position must be selected at which to assault the works and burst through and occupy the interior, and to accomplish this a preponderance of metal must be brought to bear against the immediate point of attack to silence the enemy's guns, and to open the way for an attacking column specially chosen for the occasion. The new era in field-works has so changed their character as in fact to render them almost as strong as permanent ones, and the facility with which new and successive lines of works can be constructed (so well proven throughout the whole campaign just terminated) renders it almost useless to attempt a regular siege. The open assault of works is attended with immense loss of life, but at the same time during the slow operations of the siege the sharpshooter so effectually does his work as to produce a large bill of mortality.”
[J. G. Barnard, 2 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 584.]
“Memorandum—The army having failed in the purpose of holding the Weldon road, is now lying without any definite object. Smith's and Burnside's corps are lying in trenches close up to the enemy, carrying on a quasi siege--not decided enough to accomplish anything, but by heat and sharpshooters losing men every day. The other three corps are stretched out in a line, which neither supports the other two, or is supported by them, or controls the enemy's communications. This state of things might last for a few days, but not for several weeks, which must elapse before the Nineteenth Corps can arrive. Several propositions have been made or talked of. One is to withdraw the right (i.e., Smith and Burnside) to the line of rebel forts. We have spilt too much blood in getting where we are; and, besides, the new line must in some way be extended down to the river, making it much longer than it is now. Another is to withdraw the left (making part of it a reserve to the rest), taking a line along or near theNorfolk road. This, too, would abandon ground we have dearly bought. Another is, to again swing our left around to the Weldon road, covering our left with cavalry. This would make a long line--six miles-concave to the enemy, who might throw himself on any point, or turn our left, while attacking our center. The left would be too decidedly exposed. Another proposition, which would have great merit in my mind if it were practicable, would be to throw 15,000 or 20,000 men over the Appomattox between Petersburg and the mouth of Swift Creek. But this is not practicable, unless a crossing can be found, where a bridge can be thrown with great rapidity, and General Smith has satisfied himself that there is no such point. Another proposition is, to assault the salient of the enemy's position near where our front line intersects the old line of works. We are now close up to the plateau, or ridge, over which the Jerusalem road enters Petersburg. If we can gain that plateau I do not believe Petersburg can be held any longer. A little west of the Jerusalem road, and behind the enemy's old line (which I believe now to be his rear line of defense), is an elevated swell. If we can break through near the salient and reach this point we take all his position facing Smith and Burnside in reverse, and we occupy a point from which we look down into the city. It is useless to talk about any operation of this kind, however, if it is to consist in merely ordering corps commanders "to assault." The most careful arrangements, based upon survey and study of the ground, combined action of the corps, principally directed in heavy masses upon the salient (while demonstrations are made elsewhere), and, above all, the powerful concentration of artillery, can give reasonable certainty to the operation. Meade's army (occupying a stronger position than the enemy holds) was assailed by 150 guns and their columns hurled upon his left center. This is the kind of operation which we must <ar81_585> make, if we make any. From behind and north of Taylor's house, southwardly, crossing the old works, positions must be carefully marked for as many field batteries as can be brought onto the space. Where there are woods roads must be cut, so they can be brought to the edge of the works and deployed near the salient mortars' places. The positions of which I speak (and they are the same mentioned ten days ago) enfilade and take in reverse the enemy's lines across the Jerusalem road, and counterbatter his lines in front of Burnside. The artillery should be brought into position suddenly and open fire, and keep it up until the enemy's fire is silenced; 100 guns should be used; the mortars near the salient to keep up fire until our troops reach the rebel lines. Two corps massed in successive lines should assault and all the rest be ready to follow up. I have never commanded troops, and do not pretend that I could direct these details, or say exactly what they should be; but such things have been done, and I believe could be done here.”
“Memorandum—The army having failed in the purpose of holding the Weldon road, is now lying without any definite object. Smith's and Burnside's corps are lying in trenches close up to the enemy, carrying on a quasi siege--not decided enough to accomplish anything, but by heat and sharpshooters losing men every day. The other three corps are stretched out in a line, which neither supports the other two, or is supported by them, or controls the enemy's communications. This state of things might last for a few days, but not for several weeks, which must elapse before the Nineteenth Corps can arrive. Several propositions have been made or talked of. One is to withdraw the right (i.e., Smith and Burnside) to the line of rebel forts. We have spilt too much blood in getting where we are; and, besides, the new line must in some way be extended down to the river, making it much longer than it is now. Another is to withdraw the left (making part of it a reserve to the rest), taking a line along or near theNorfolk road. This, too, would abandon ground we have dearly bought. Another is, to again swing our left around to the Weldon road, covering our left with cavalry. This would make a long line--six miles-concave to the enemy, who might throw himself on any point, or turn our left, while attacking our center. The left would be too decidedly exposed. Another proposition, which would have great merit in my mind if it were practicable, would be to throw 15,000 or 20,000 men over the Appomattox between Petersburg and the mouth of Swift Creek. But this is not practicable, unless a crossing can be found, where a bridge can be thrown with great rapidity, and General Smith has satisfied himself that there is no such point. Another proposition is, to assault the salient of the enemy's position near where our front line intersects the old line of works. We are now close up to the plateau, or ridge, over which the Jerusalem road enters Petersburg. If we can gain that plateau I do not believe Petersburg can be held any longer. A little west of the Jerusalem road, and behind the enemy's old line (which I believe now to be his rear line of defense), is an elevated swell. If we can break through near the salient and reach this point we take all his position facing Smith and Burnside in reverse, and we occupy a point from which we look down into the city. It is useless to talk about any operation of this kind, however, if it is to consist in merely ordering corps commanders "to assault." The most careful arrangements, based upon survey and study of the ground, combined action of the corps, principally directed in heavy masses upon the salient (while demonstrations are made elsewhere), and, above all, the powerful concentration of artillery, can give reasonable certainty to the operation. Meade's army (occupying a stronger position than the enemy holds) was assailed by 150 guns and their columns hurled upon his left center. This is the kind of operation which we must <ar81_585> make, if we make any. From behind and north of Taylor's house, southwardly, crossing the old works, positions must be carefully marked for as many field batteries as can be brought onto the space. Where there are woods roads must be cut, so they can be brought to the edge of the works and deployed near the salient mortars' places. The positions of which I speak (and they are the same mentioned ten days ago) enfilade and take in reverse the enemy's lines across the Jerusalem road, and counterbatter his lines in front of Burnside. The artillery should be brought into position suddenly and open fire, and keep it up until the enemy's fire is silenced; 100 guns should be used; the mortars near the salient to keep up fire until our troops reach the rebel lines. Two corps massed in successive lines should assault and all the rest be ready to follow up. I have never commanded troops, and do not pretend that I could direct these details, or say exactly what they should be; but such things have been done, and I believe could be done here.”
[Grant to Meade, 3 July 1864, 10:30 a.m., OR 40, pt. 2, 599.]
“Do you think it possible, by a bold and decisive attack, to break through the enemy's center, say in General Warren's front somewhere? If this is determined on we would want full preparations made in advance so there should be no balk. Roads would have to be made to bring the troops up rapidly; batteries constructed so as to bring the greatest amount of artillery to bear possible on the points of attack; and all to the right of the attack strengthened to be held by the smallest number of men. I have felt unwilling to give the troops any violent exercise until we get rain to settle the dust, and now, even if we should get rain, all operations except preparations will have to be deferred until the cavalry is again fit for service. I send this to get your views on the subject. If it is not attempted we will have to give you an army sufficient to meet most of Lee's forces and march around Petersburg and come in from above. This probably could not be done before the arrival of the Nineteenth Corps.”
“Do you think it possible, by a bold and decisive attack, to break through the enemy's center, say in General Warren's front somewhere? If this is determined on we would want full preparations made in advance so there should be no balk. Roads would have to be made to bring the troops up rapidly; batteries constructed so as to bring the greatest amount of artillery to bear possible on the points of attack; and all to the right of the attack strengthened to be held by the smallest number of men. I have felt unwilling to give the troops any violent exercise until we get rain to settle the dust, and now, even if we should get rain, all operations except preparations will have to be deferred until the cavalry is again fit for service. I send this to get your views on the subject. If it is not attempted we will have to give you an army sufficient to meet most of Lee's forces and march around Petersburg and come in from above. This probably could not be done before the arrival of the Nineteenth Corps.”
[Meade to Grant, 3 July 1864, noon, OR 40, pt. 2, 599]
"Your dispatch received. Before replying it will be necessary I should see both Warren and Burnside to obtain information. I am now under the impression that the former does not consider an attack in his front practicable, but the latter was under the opinion some days ago that he could, in his front, break through the enemy's line. I will advise you as soon as possible of my views fully."
"Your dispatch received. Before replying it will be necessary I should see both Warren and Burnside to obtain information. I am now under the impression that the former does not consider an attack in his front practicable, but the latter was under the opinion some days ago that he could, in his front, break through the enemy's line. I will advise you as soon as possible of my views fully."
|
[Barnard to Col. Henry Pleasants (48th Pa. Vols.), 3 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 610-11.]
“In order to be enabled to have a clear judgment of the progress of the mining work in front of Major-General Burnside's rifle-pits, I would like to be furnished with- “I. A rough longitudinal section made after a certain scale and laid through our works neighboring the mine, through the mine gallery, and through the enemy's works to be attacked by the mine. This section, with all important numbers inscribed, will show, besides the profile of our and the enemy's works, the location of the mine-gallery entrance with reference to our own defense line; the arrangement of the entrance, whether by a shaft or by an inclined gallery, &c.; the height of the gallery in both the places not framed and such as are supplied with frames; the length of the intended gallery; its depth under the natural horizon near the entrance and near the powder chamber, and finally the location, length, and height of the latter. <ar81_611> “II. A profile of the gallery showing its width in framed and unframed places and the width of the powder chamber. “III. (a) When was the mining work begun? (State day and hour.) (b) Has it been continued night and day without any interruption, and how many men were and are engaged on it at the same time? (e) When will the gallery be finished? “IV. What kind of soil is probably to be expected around the powder chamber? “V. What is the intended weight of the charge, and what is the expected diameter of the crater measured on its surface? “VI. By what means shall the mine be fired, supposed that it shall be fired as soon as possible and with the least loss of time? “VII. What means shall be used for tamping the mine, and at what length shall this be done? “VIII. Where shall be the stand-point of the miner firing the charge? (Distance from the latter, &c.) “IX. At what time in the day shall the mine be fired? “X. What measures are premeditated by the engineer department in accordance with the [sic] commanding general to secure the possession of the crater effected by the mine and to facilitate its defense? “The questions above should be answered without delay and as shortly as possible only with reference to its numbers, i.e., answer to III, a, b, c, &c., IV, &c.” [Barnard to Col. Henry Pleasants (48th Pa. Vols.), 3 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 610-11.] |
[Pleasants, endorsement, 7 July 1864, on Barnard to Pleasants, 3 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 611.]
“Answer to question 2: The gallery or tunnel is supported by props along its whole course at a distance from each other ranging from three to thirty feet, according to the nature of the roof. When the tunnel reaches a point immediately underneath the enemy's breast-works it is proposed to drive two galleries, each about 100 feet in length, whose position will be immediately underneath the enemy's fort and breastwork. “Answer to question 3: (a) At 12 m. on the 25th of June, 1864. (b) The mining has been carried on without interruption since it was begun. There are 210 men employed every twenty-four hours, but only two can mine at a time at the extremity of the work. (e) The tunnel will reach the enemy's work in about seven or eight days. “Answer to question 4: Sandy soil. “Answers to questions 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 still under consideration. The mine is ventilated by means of an air-shaft, with a furnace to rarify the air and boxes to convey the gases from the interior of the gallery to the shaft.” NOTE: On July 4, Barnard was relieved of his field duties by order of the Secretary of War and ordered to report to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D. C. |
[Reports of Col. N. Michler, OR 40, pt. 3, 291-92.]
“On the 3d of July the major-general commanding addressed a communication to the chief of artillery and chief engineer to know "whether any offensive operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable." The commanding general of the Ninth Corps had authorized Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, commanding the Forty-eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, to drive a gallery for a mine to blow up one of the enemy's batteries in his front, and the above officers were also directed to examine the place and ascertain whether an assault could be advantageously made, should the operation prove <ar80_292> successful. The result of their investigation is set forth in the following extract from the reply made on the 6th, in compliance with the instructions received by them:
“The enemy's front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts connected by infantry parapets. The ground in front is obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable. Regular approaches must therefore be resorted to. It is probable the siege will be a very long one, inasmuch as soon as one line of works is carried another equally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained which looks into the town.
“The front of attack decided upon was a salient of the enemy's line on or near the Jerusalem plank road.”
“On the 3d of July the major-general commanding addressed a communication to the chief of artillery and chief engineer to know "whether any offensive operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable." The commanding general of the Ninth Corps had authorized Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, commanding the Forty-eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, to drive a gallery for a mine to blow up one of the enemy's batteries in his front, and the above officers were also directed to examine the place and ascertain whether an assault could be advantageously made, should the operation prove <ar80_292> successful. The result of their investigation is set forth in the following extract from the reply made on the 6th, in compliance with the instructions received by them:
“The enemy's front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts connected by infantry parapets. The ground in front is obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable. Regular approaches must therefore be resorted to. It is probable the siege will be a very long one, inasmuch as soon as one line of works is carried another equally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained which looks into the town.
“The front of attack decided upon was a salient of the enemy's line on or near the Jerusalem plank road.”
[Meade to J. C. Duane and Henry J. Hunt, 3 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 600.]
“The lieutenant-general commanding is desirous of knowing whether any offensive operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable. Major-General Warren does not deem any practicable in his front, but Major-General Burnside, who is now running a gallery for a mine, is of the opinion that if successful in this operation an assault could be made to advantage. I desire you carefully to examine the proposed point of attack, after conferring with General Burnside, and furnish me with your views. Should an attack be determined upon, the maximum amount of artillery should be brought to bear upon the immediate point of attack and to the right and left. Roads should be opened and places prepared for the assembling of the Second and Sixth Corps, that will be transferred to take part in the attack, and arrangements should be made in preparing a line in advance for the withdrawal of the left flank of the Fifth Corps and the protection of the same. You will please give me your views at the earliest possible moment, that the necessary orders may be issued and requisitions made. Both Generals Burnside and Warren have been notified of your instructions and directed to confer with you and facilitate your operations.”
“The lieutenant-general commanding is desirous of knowing whether any offensive operations from the lines now held by this army are practicable. Major-General Warren does not deem any practicable in his front, but Major-General Burnside, who is now running a gallery for a mine, is of the opinion that if successful in this operation an assault could be made to advantage. I desire you carefully to examine the proposed point of attack, after conferring with General Burnside, and furnish me with your views. Should an attack be determined upon, the maximum amount of artillery should be brought to bear upon the immediate point of attack and to the right and left. Roads should be opened and places prepared for the assembling of the Second and Sixth Corps, that will be transferred to take part in the attack, and arrangements should be made in preparing a line in advance for the withdrawal of the left flank of the Fifth Corps and the protection of the same. You will please give me your views at the earliest possible moment, that the necessary orders may be issued and requisitions made. Both Generals Burnside and Warren have been notified of your instructions and directed to confer with you and facilitate your operations.”
[Warren to Meade, 4 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 624.]
“I have seen General Barnard this morning and he talks as if he thought we could carry the enemy's line along the plank road. I feel all the more interested in having the subject considered by competent officers in staff positions, so that the opinion can rest on mere military grounds and not hereafter be a question of individual willingness, ability, or boldness.”
“I have seen General Barnard this morning and he talks as if he thought we could carry the enemy's line along the plank road. I feel all the more interested in having the subject considered by competent officers in staff positions, so that the opinion can rest on mere military grounds and not hereafter be a question of individual willingness, ability, or boldness.”
[Meade to Grant, 4 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 619-20.]
“After examination and conference with corps commanders I am satisfied an immediate assault on the enemy's line in my front is impracticable. The enemy now occupies the line held by him on the 18th ultimo, which I vainly endeavored to dislodge him from. Not having succeeded then, when he had only occupied this line some twelve hours, I cannot expect to do it now that he has been two weeks strengthening and adding to it. The only plan to dislodge the enemy from this line is by a regular approach. Major-General Burnside is now running a gallery to a mine to be constructed under a battery on this line, which General B. thinks when exploded will enable him by a formidable assault to carry the line of works. I have directed the chiefs of artillery and of engineers to examine into this point and to make all the necessary preliminary arrangements for the establishment of batteries bearing on the point <ar81_620> of attack, opening roads, and preparing places of arms for the assembling of the supporting columns. Should this attack be made, which, under existing circumstances, I deem the most practicable, it will be necessary to withdraw the Second and Sixth Corps to take part in it, and the left of the Fifth Corps will have to be thrown back for self-protection. A line for this purpose will be prepared in advance, but this will require the giving up the Jerusalem plank road. With your present numbers and existing condition of affairs, I am of the opinion active operations against the enemy in his present position the most advisable, as it leaves our communications open and intact. The movement on the enemy's right flank as suggested is liable to the objection of separating your forces with the enemy between the two parts, with having to abandon the communications of this army, and the danger after crossing the Appomattox that the enemy may be found strongly posted behind Swift Run, requiring further flank movements, more time, further separation from a base, and more hazard in reopening communications, our experience since crossing the Rapidan having proved the facility with which the enemy can interpose to check an onward movement. If we had the force to extend around the south side of the Appomattox I should prefer doing so and employing the cavalry to destroy the enemy's communications. It will take General Burnside over a week to complete his mine and General Sheridan two weeks to get his animals into a serviceable condition.”
“After examination and conference with corps commanders I am satisfied an immediate assault on the enemy's line in my front is impracticable. The enemy now occupies the line held by him on the 18th ultimo, which I vainly endeavored to dislodge him from. Not having succeeded then, when he had only occupied this line some twelve hours, I cannot expect to do it now that he has been two weeks strengthening and adding to it. The only plan to dislodge the enemy from this line is by a regular approach. Major-General Burnside is now running a gallery to a mine to be constructed under a battery on this line, which General B. thinks when exploded will enable him by a formidable assault to carry the line of works. I have directed the chiefs of artillery and of engineers to examine into this point and to make all the necessary preliminary arrangements for the establishment of batteries bearing on the point <ar81_620> of attack, opening roads, and preparing places of arms for the assembling of the supporting columns. Should this attack be made, which, under existing circumstances, I deem the most practicable, it will be necessary to withdraw the Second and Sixth Corps to take part in it, and the left of the Fifth Corps will have to be thrown back for self-protection. A line for this purpose will be prepared in advance, but this will require the giving up the Jerusalem plank road. With your present numbers and existing condition of affairs, I am of the opinion active operations against the enemy in his present position the most advisable, as it leaves our communications open and intact. The movement on the enemy's right flank as suggested is liable to the objection of separating your forces with the enemy between the two parts, with having to abandon the communications of this army, and the danger after crossing the Appomattox that the enemy may be found strongly posted behind Swift Run, requiring further flank movements, more time, further separation from a base, and more hazard in reopening communications, our experience since crossing the Rapidan having proved the facility with which the enemy can interpose to check an onward movement. If we had the force to extend around the south side of the Appomattox I should prefer doing so and employing the cavalry to destroy the enemy's communications. It will take General Burnside over a week to complete his mine and General Sheridan two weeks to get his animals into a serviceable condition.”
Grant to Meade, 5 July 1864, Grant Papers, vol. 11, 173
My Eng. officers make the same report of the lack of practicability of assault any where along our present front that you do. At present we are doing very well, all the roads are cut and the enemy are living now on half rations. This I presume is certain as well as the further fact that discontent is beginning to prevail. I believe the enemy ... I will not do so until more is known about what the enemy are doing. The best we can do now is to strengthen our present line on Burnside's and Warren's front and advance by gradual approaches as you propose. As soon as the Cavalry is in working order we will make another raid supporting the Cavalry as far as the Weldon road with Infantry."
My Eng. officers make the same report of the lack of practicability of assault any where along our present front that you do. At present we are doing very well, all the roads are cut and the enemy are living now on half rations. This I presume is certain as well as the further fact that discontent is beginning to prevail. I believe the enemy ... I will not do so until more is known about what the enemy are doing. The best we can do now is to strengthen our present line on Burnside's and Warren's front and advance by gradual approaches as you propose. As soon as the Cavalry is in working order we will make another raid supporting the Cavalry as far as the Weldon road with Infantry."
[Henry J. Hunt & J. C. Duane to Humphreys, 6 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 1, 285]
“SIR: We have the honor to make the following report of an examination of the enemy's lines in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps in compliance with instructions of the commanding general given in a letter dated July 3:
“The general direction of the enemy's line from the front of the Hare house to the plank road is north and south. The line is indented and apparently well flanked. From the plank road the line runs in a southwesterly direction. The salient thus formed is on a commanding ridge, which overlooks and flanks, by the artillery fire, the work in front of the Ninth Corps. It would, therefore, appear that the first attack should be made from the front of the Fifth Corps. When the first line of the enemy's works at this point has been taken or their fire silenced, the attack by the Ninth Corps may be commenced. The enemy's front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts connected by infantry parapets; the ground in front obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable; regular approaches must, therefore, be resorted to. It is probable that the siege will be a long one, inasmuch as soon as one line of works is carried another equally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained which looks into the town.”
“SIR: We have the honor to make the following report of an examination of the enemy's lines in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps in compliance with instructions of the commanding general given in a letter dated July 3:
“The general direction of the enemy's line from the front of the Hare house to the plank road is north and south. The line is indented and apparently well flanked. From the plank road the line runs in a southwesterly direction. The salient thus formed is on a commanding ridge, which overlooks and flanks, by the artillery fire, the work in front of the Ninth Corps. It would, therefore, appear that the first attack should be made from the front of the Fifth Corps. When the first line of the enemy's works at this point has been taken or their fire silenced, the attack by the Ninth Corps may be commenced. The enemy's front has been very much strengthened. It consists of a system of redoubts connected by infantry parapets; the ground in front obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements, rendering an assault impracticable; regular approaches must, therefore, be resorted to. It is probable that the siege will be a long one, inasmuch as soon as one line of works is carried another equally strong will be found behind it, and this will continue until the ridge is attained which looks into the town.”
[Grant to Meade, 7 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 62.]
“In making regular approaches would it not be well to avoid making any at the salient where General Barnard gave it as his opinion that a successful assault could be made, if one could be made at all?”
[Meade to Grant, 7 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 62.]
“General Barnard never communicated any opinion to me. I presume, however, you and he refer to the salient on the Jerusalem plank road. If so, this is the best point for a regular approach; indeed, it is essential it should be taken before a lodgment in any other part of the line, if made, could be maintained. I will send you to-morrow early a report with a sketch.”
“In making regular approaches would it not be well to avoid making any at the salient where General Barnard gave it as his opinion that a successful assault could be made, if one could be made at all?”
[Meade to Grant, 7 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 2, 62.]
“General Barnard never communicated any opinion to me. I presume, however, you and he refer to the salient on the Jerusalem plank road. If so, this is the best point for a regular approach; indeed, it is essential it should be taken before a lodgment in any other part of the line, if made, could be maintained. I will send you to-morrow early a report with a sketch.”
[Meade to Grant, 7 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 61.]
“GENERAL: I transmit herewith the report of the chief of artillery and the acting chief engineer made in pursuance of an order to reconnoiter the enemy's position in front of the lines of this army. You will see from the accompanying sketch that the point where the mine now being dug by Major-General Burnside is to be exploded is taken somewhat in reverse by the guns in the salient of the work near the Gregory house on the plank road. It therefore becomes necessary to effect a lodgment in this salient before the mine can be exploded. In order to obtain troops to relieve those in the trenches, and also to have a reserve, it is proposed in case regular approaches are made to occupy the line of redoubts and breast- works as indicated on the sketch. This will effectually cover the left flank of the army and leave at least a corps in reserve. These redoubts are in process of construction and the materials for regular approaches being collected, but no work as yet undertaken beyond the running of the gallery for the mine. Further operations will be dependent on your orders. It is proper I should advise you that in my judgment the operations proposed will be slow and tedious; that we shall perhaps have to take several lines before reaching the Appomattox; that then we shall have this river to cross and subsequently Swift Run; all of which would be turned and avoided should regular approaches be successfully made from the Bermuda Hundred front. Please advise me at your earliest convenience if you desire the operations commenced here against the salient on the plank road.”
“GENERAL: I transmit herewith the report of the chief of artillery and the acting chief engineer made in pursuance of an order to reconnoiter the enemy's position in front of the lines of this army. You will see from the accompanying sketch that the point where the mine now being dug by Major-General Burnside is to be exploded is taken somewhat in reverse by the guns in the salient of the work near the Gregory house on the plank road. It therefore becomes necessary to effect a lodgment in this salient before the mine can be exploded. In order to obtain troops to relieve those in the trenches, and also to have a reserve, it is proposed in case regular approaches are made to occupy the line of redoubts and breast- works as indicated on the sketch. This will effectually cover the left flank of the army and leave at least a corps in reserve. These redoubts are in process of construction and the materials for regular approaches being collected, but no work as yet undertaken beyond the running of the gallery for the mine. Further operations will be dependent on your orders. It is proper I should advise you that in my judgment the operations proposed will be slow and tedious; that we shall perhaps have to take several lines before reaching the Appomattox; that then we shall have this river to cross and subsequently Swift Run; all of which would be turned and avoided should regular approaches be successfully made from the Bermuda Hundred front. Please advise me at your earliest convenience if you desire the operations commenced here against the salient on the plank road.”
[Meade to Burnside, 7 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 66.]
“GENERAL: I am instructed by the major-general commanding to say, that upon an examination of the enemy's intrenched position by the chief engineer and the chief of artillery, it has been concluded that the operations upon your front cannot be carried to a successful conclusion until the salients on the front of the Fifth Corps are in our possession or under our control. Accordingly it has been determined to conduct regular approaches upon the two fronts of your corps and that of General Warren simultaneously, and in order to give unity and harmony to these operations the siege works will be constructed under the direction of the chief engineer of the army, and the disposition and use of the siege artillery will be under the direction of the chief of artillery of the army. An order to that effect, prescribing in general terms the manner in which the siege operations will be conducted, will be issued, and in the meantime the commanding general prefers that no additional batteries of siege guns should be established.”
“GENERAL: I am instructed by the major-general commanding to say, that upon an examination of the enemy's intrenched position by the chief engineer and the chief of artillery, it has been concluded that the operations upon your front cannot be carried to a successful conclusion until the salients on the front of the Fifth Corps are in our possession or under our control. Accordingly it has been determined to conduct regular approaches upon the two fronts of your corps and that of General Warren simultaneously, and in order to give unity and harmony to these operations the siege works will be constructed under the direction of the chief engineer of the army, and the disposition and use of the siege artillery will be under the direction of the chief of artillery of the army. An order to that effect, prescribing in general terms the manner in which the siege operations will be conducted, will be issued, and in the meantime the commanding general prefers that no additional batteries of siege guns should be established.”
[Grant to Meade, July 8, 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 72-73.]
“Colonel Comstock is going out this morning and will explain to you my idea. If the approaches are made it will be with the view of ultimately making an assault on the enemy's lines, but I have always hoped to go through in General Butler's front so as to carry the north bank of Swift Creek. This, however, cannot be done until the Nineteenth Corps arrives, without giving up too much ground that we have <ar82_73> already fought for. This would make no difference, except in case of failure to get through to Swift Creek. The advantage of commencing our regular approaches on your front now would simply be that we would be that far advanced if we were compelled at last to advance in that way, and it would tend to divert the enemy from the proposed advance in General Butler's front. We ought by all means to cut the Weldon road so as to make it useless to enemy. I think Wright's two divisions should take the place of Hancock's corps, and the latter should support the cavalry whilst it destroys the road down as far as Hicksford. Preparations for this, I think, should be made at once so as to start from your left by the night of the 10th.”
[Meade to Grant, 9 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 94-95.]
“I saw Colonel Comstock last evening when your telegram was received. Your orders in relation to making regular approaches and sending the Second Corps and cavalry to destroy the Weldon railroad shall be executed as promptly as possible. Some little delay will be necessary to enable me to complete the line of redoubts which are necessary to protect the left flank of the army after the departure of the Second Corps. … The engineers say the redoubts will be ready by the 12th. This will enable Hancock and <ar82_95> Sheridan to get off on the 13th. How far do you think the infantry support should go? The whole distance, forty miles, or only part of the way?”
“Colonel Comstock is going out this morning and will explain to you my idea. If the approaches are made it will be with the view of ultimately making an assault on the enemy's lines, but I have always hoped to go through in General Butler's front so as to carry the north bank of Swift Creek. This, however, cannot be done until the Nineteenth Corps arrives, without giving up too much ground that we have <ar82_73> already fought for. This would make no difference, except in case of failure to get through to Swift Creek. The advantage of commencing our regular approaches on your front now would simply be that we would be that far advanced if we were compelled at last to advance in that way, and it would tend to divert the enemy from the proposed advance in General Butler's front. We ought by all means to cut the Weldon road so as to make it useless to enemy. I think Wright's two divisions should take the place of Hancock's corps, and the latter should support the cavalry whilst it destroys the road down as far as Hicksford. Preparations for this, I think, should be made at once so as to start from your left by the night of the 10th.”
[Meade to Grant, 9 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 94-95.]
“I saw Colonel Comstock last evening when your telegram was received. Your orders in relation to making regular approaches and sending the Second Corps and cavalry to destroy the Weldon railroad shall be executed as promptly as possible. Some little delay will be necessary to enable me to complete the line of redoubts which are necessary to protect the left flank of the army after the departure of the Second Corps. … The engineers say the redoubts will be ready by the 12th. This will enable Hancock and <ar82_95> Sheridan to get off on the 13th. How far do you think the infantry support should go? The whole distance, forty miles, or only part of the way?”
[Orders, AoP, 9 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 1, 159-60.]
“1. The operations of this army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the fronts opposed to General Burnside's and General Warren's corps.
2. The siege-works will be constructed under the direction of the acting chief engineer of the army, Maj. J. C. Duane, Corps of Engineers, upon plans prepared by him and approved by the commanding general. Those plans that relate to the employment of the artillery will be prepared jointly by the acting chief engineer and the chief of artillery of the army, Brig. Gen. H. J. Hunt, U.S. Volunteers. Duplicates of the plan of siege will be furnished the commanders of the Ninth and Fifth Corps.
3. The engineer officers and troops of the army will receive their orders from the chief engineer, who will regulate the hours at which they will go on duty.
4. The siege artillery will be served under the direction of the chief of artillery of the army, who will prescribe the hours at which artillery officers and troops go on duty.
5. A general of the trenches will be detailed daily for each of the two fronts designated, where the siege operations are carried on by the commanders of the Ninth and Fifth Corps, respectively.
Guards of the trenches will in like manner be detailed daily from those corps. The strength of the guard will be determined by the commander of the corps furnishing it.
The general of the trenches is responsible for the security of the siege operations, and the police and discipline of the trenches, and will dispose the guard so as to protect the working parties and repel sorties. For armed purposes, as well as for police and discipline, he commands all in the trenches. He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day previous to going on duty, and will confer with the officers of engineers and artillery in charge of the trenches and batteries, and visit the localities of the siege-works, so as to make himself familiar with the ground and determine upon the best disposition of the guard. He will go on duty at 8 a.m., and, upon being relieved, <ar80_160> will turn over to his successor, all orders and instructions and information that he is possessed of pertaining to the duties specified. The commander of the guard of the trenches will report to him for instructions at 8 a.m. The guard of the trenches will go on duty at dark. Previous to the commencement of his tour of service the commander will report for instructions to the general of the trenches. The commander of the guard will report hourly to the general of the trenches what is transpiring in front and immediately anything of importance. The general of the trenches will make similar reports to the corps commander, who will transmit anything important to the commander of the army. Upon being relieved the general of the trenches will make a written report to his corps commander of the operations carried on during his tour, which will be forwarded to the commanding general of the army.
6. For the work of the trenches details from the two corps named will be made upon the requisitions of the chiefs of engineers and artillery. These requisitions will specify the character and locality of the work to be performed. An officer of high rank will be detailed daily to take charge of the working parties of each corps. He will be responsible for the faithful and energetic performance of duty by the working parties, and will see that they conform to the directions of the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the works. In the event of an attack he will command the working parties under the orders of the general of the trenches, and as soon after the commencement of his tour of duty as practicable he will report to that officer the manner in which the working parties are distributed. He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day before he goes on duty, and will confer with the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the trenches, and receive information from them as to the manner of performing the work, and visit the localities before dark, so as to make himself familiar with the same. He will go on duty at 8 a.m. Upon being relieved he will turn over to his successor all orders, instructions, and information pertaining to the duty that he may be possessed of. Working parties will go on duty just before daylight. They will be equipped for action. Upon being relieved he will make a written report to his corps commander of the work executed by the working parties under his charge, which will be forwarded to the major-general commanding the army.
7. Materials for the siege will be prepared by working parties detailed from the corps not in the trenches, upon requisitions of the acting chief engineer and chief of artillery.
8. The corps will relieve each other in the duties of the trenches should it be found necessary.
9. The acting chief engineer and chief of artillery will report every twelve hours to the commanding general the progress made in the operations. The morning report will include a statement of the work proposed to be executed in the next twenty-four hours following the tour of working duty then going on. These reports will be accompanied by drawings exhibiting the same. Duplicates of these reports will be furnished to the commanders of the corps on whose fronts the operations are conducted.
[GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General” [Duane & Hunt to Humphreys, 10 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 125-126.]
“In conformity with instructions contained in paragraph 2 of orders dated June [July] 9, we submit the following plan for the operations against the enemy's works in front of the line occupied by this army:
“First. The lines of the enemy being in front of the crest that overlooks Petersburg, the object to be attained is the possession of this crest, which will probably decide the fate of Petersburg.
“Second. The general direction of the enemy's line from opposite the right of the Ninth Corps to the left of the Fifth is north and south; opposite the left of the Fifth Corps, near the plank or Jerusalem road, the line turns to the west, forming an angle with the first, somewhat greater than a right angle.
“Third. The line is indented, and thus affords to a certain extent flank defense. At intervals batteries are placed, which may be increased in number almost at will. At certain parts, and notably at the angle and to the west of and near the plank road, there are strong redoubts prepared for guns, and within the angle the ground is favorable for the construction by the enemy of interior intrenchments. <ar82_126>
“Fourth. The salient, formed by the redoubt at the angle of the enemy's line, flanks that part of the line in front of the Ninth Corps. Its distance from the line of the Fifth Corps varies from 400 to 800 yards. From the salient to the redoubt south of it, some 500 yards; the works face a space of apparently smooth open plain. Between the Fifth Corps and the salient a ravine commences, rapidly deepening becomes quite deep in front of the Ninth Corps, which has passed it at one point and effected a lodgment within about 150 yards of the enemy's line and immediately in front of one of his batteries. Toward this General Burnside is running a mine, with the intention of destroying the battery and immediately assaulting the works, and if possible gaining the crest overlooking Petersburg.
“Fifth. To render an assault successful, it is necessary to destroy the obstructions, abatis, palisades, &c., in front of this line, to silence, if practicable, the guns, and especially to capture or effectually silence the redoubt at the salient of the enemy's line, which not only flanks that line, but sweeps the ground on which the supports to the assaulting column must pass.
Sixth. To destroy or to occupy the salient regular approaches are the proper means. The ground in front is favorable as a whole, and in the reports of the chief of artillery and myself of the 6th instant this plan was proposed. The recent reduction of force of the army will not, it is understood, permit the occupation of any ground in front of the south line of the enemy's defenses, and we are therefore limited to such operations as we can effect on a line parallel to that of the enemy facing east.
“Seventh. To effect this the lines now occupied by the Fifth Corps should be advanced as far as practicable, if possible to the edge of the ravine before mentioned, and as much artillery as can be safely and advantageously used placed in battery. Artillery should also be placed in position in Burnside's front) not only for his direct fire, but to bear upon the salient and batteries in front of the Fifth and Eighteenth Corps.
“Eighth. The enemy's fire being silenced approaches should be made if practicable across the ravine, and possession so gained of the angle, and the way cleared at the same time for the assault by the Ninth Corps. The mine should not be sprung until all the preparations for an assault are made.
“Ninth. The crest above the enemy's present line may be crowned with batteries by him. Its possession gives the defense great advantage over the attack. If the assault is successful an immediate and vigorous attempt should be made to get possession of the crest. Should it fail the assaulting troops should make good a lodgment as far in advance as practicable, and operations be continued from the salient to get possession of the crest behind it. To do this it will probably be necessary to occupy more ground to our left.
“Tenth. Should these operations offer to the enemy in front of the Eighteenth Corps means of annoyance, which are not at present very apparent, the necessary measures must be taken to overcome them as they develop themselves.
“Eleventh. The advantages of position on the part of the enemy, with the restricted numbers which will prevent our making use of the ground which would envelop him, will make the success of our operations difficult and probably costly, both in time and men.”
<ar82_127> [Indorsement.] “The above project, being in conformity with my views, is approved and adopted. The operations against the salient on the plank road and the battery in front of the Ninth Corps will be at once commenced.
“1. The operations of this army against the intrenched position of the enemy defending Petersburg will be by regular approaches on the fronts opposed to General Burnside's and General Warren's corps.
2. The siege-works will be constructed under the direction of the acting chief engineer of the army, Maj. J. C. Duane, Corps of Engineers, upon plans prepared by him and approved by the commanding general. Those plans that relate to the employment of the artillery will be prepared jointly by the acting chief engineer and the chief of artillery of the army, Brig. Gen. H. J. Hunt, U.S. Volunteers. Duplicates of the plan of siege will be furnished the commanders of the Ninth and Fifth Corps.
3. The engineer officers and troops of the army will receive their orders from the chief engineer, who will regulate the hours at which they will go on duty.
4. The siege artillery will be served under the direction of the chief of artillery of the army, who will prescribe the hours at which artillery officers and troops go on duty.
5. A general of the trenches will be detailed daily for each of the two fronts designated, where the siege operations are carried on by the commanders of the Ninth and Fifth Corps, respectively.
Guards of the trenches will in like manner be detailed daily from those corps. The strength of the guard will be determined by the commander of the corps furnishing it.
The general of the trenches is responsible for the security of the siege operations, and the police and discipline of the trenches, and will dispose the guard so as to protect the working parties and repel sorties. For armed purposes, as well as for police and discipline, he commands all in the trenches. He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day previous to going on duty, and will confer with the officers of engineers and artillery in charge of the trenches and batteries, and visit the localities of the siege-works, so as to make himself familiar with the ground and determine upon the best disposition of the guard. He will go on duty at 8 a.m., and, upon being relieved, <ar80_160> will turn over to his successor, all orders and instructions and information that he is possessed of pertaining to the duties specified. The commander of the guard of the trenches will report to him for instructions at 8 a.m. The guard of the trenches will go on duty at dark. Previous to the commencement of his tour of service the commander will report for instructions to the general of the trenches. The commander of the guard will report hourly to the general of the trenches what is transpiring in front and immediately anything of importance. The general of the trenches will make similar reports to the corps commander, who will transmit anything important to the commander of the army. Upon being relieved the general of the trenches will make a written report to his corps commander of the operations carried on during his tour, which will be forwarded to the commanding general of the army.
6. For the work of the trenches details from the two corps named will be made upon the requisitions of the chiefs of engineers and artillery. These requisitions will specify the character and locality of the work to be performed. An officer of high rank will be detailed daily to take charge of the working parties of each corps. He will be responsible for the faithful and energetic performance of duty by the working parties, and will see that they conform to the directions of the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the works. In the event of an attack he will command the working parties under the orders of the general of the trenches, and as soon after the commencement of his tour of duty as practicable he will report to that officer the manner in which the working parties are distributed. He will report for instructions at the headquarters of his corps on the day before he goes on duty, and will confer with the engineer and artillery officers in charge of the trenches, and receive information from them as to the manner of performing the work, and visit the localities before dark, so as to make himself familiar with the same. He will go on duty at 8 a.m. Upon being relieved he will turn over to his successor all orders, instructions, and information pertaining to the duty that he may be possessed of. Working parties will go on duty just before daylight. They will be equipped for action. Upon being relieved he will make a written report to his corps commander of the work executed by the working parties under his charge, which will be forwarded to the major-general commanding the army.
7. Materials for the siege will be prepared by working parties detailed from the corps not in the trenches, upon requisitions of the acting chief engineer and chief of artillery.
8. The corps will relieve each other in the duties of the trenches should it be found necessary.
9. The acting chief engineer and chief of artillery will report every twelve hours to the commanding general the progress made in the operations. The morning report will include a statement of the work proposed to be executed in the next twenty-four hours following the tour of working duty then going on. These reports will be accompanied by drawings exhibiting the same. Duplicates of these reports will be furnished to the commanders of the corps on whose fronts the operations are conducted.
[GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General” [Duane & Hunt to Humphreys, 10 July 1864, OR 40, pt. 3, 125-126.]
“In conformity with instructions contained in paragraph 2 of orders dated June [July] 9, we submit the following plan for the operations against the enemy's works in front of the line occupied by this army:
“First. The lines of the enemy being in front of the crest that overlooks Petersburg, the object to be attained is the possession of this crest, which will probably decide the fate of Petersburg.
“Second. The general direction of the enemy's line from opposite the right of the Ninth Corps to the left of the Fifth is north and south; opposite the left of the Fifth Corps, near the plank or Jerusalem road, the line turns to the west, forming an angle with the first, somewhat greater than a right angle.
“Third. The line is indented, and thus affords to a certain extent flank defense. At intervals batteries are placed, which may be increased in number almost at will. At certain parts, and notably at the angle and to the west of and near the plank road, there are strong redoubts prepared for guns, and within the angle the ground is favorable for the construction by the enemy of interior intrenchments. <ar82_126>
“Fourth. The salient, formed by the redoubt at the angle of the enemy's line, flanks that part of the line in front of the Ninth Corps. Its distance from the line of the Fifth Corps varies from 400 to 800 yards. From the salient to the redoubt south of it, some 500 yards; the works face a space of apparently smooth open plain. Between the Fifth Corps and the salient a ravine commences, rapidly deepening becomes quite deep in front of the Ninth Corps, which has passed it at one point and effected a lodgment within about 150 yards of the enemy's line and immediately in front of one of his batteries. Toward this General Burnside is running a mine, with the intention of destroying the battery and immediately assaulting the works, and if possible gaining the crest overlooking Petersburg.
“Fifth. To render an assault successful, it is necessary to destroy the obstructions, abatis, palisades, &c., in front of this line, to silence, if practicable, the guns, and especially to capture or effectually silence the redoubt at the salient of the enemy's line, which not only flanks that line, but sweeps the ground on which the supports to the assaulting column must pass.
Sixth. To destroy or to occupy the salient regular approaches are the proper means. The ground in front is favorable as a whole, and in the reports of the chief of artillery and myself of the 6th instant this plan was proposed. The recent reduction of force of the army will not, it is understood, permit the occupation of any ground in front of the south line of the enemy's defenses, and we are therefore limited to such operations as we can effect on a line parallel to that of the enemy facing east.
“Seventh. To effect this the lines now occupied by the Fifth Corps should be advanced as far as practicable, if possible to the edge of the ravine before mentioned, and as much artillery as can be safely and advantageously used placed in battery. Artillery should also be placed in position in Burnside's front) not only for his direct fire, but to bear upon the salient and batteries in front of the Fifth and Eighteenth Corps.
“Eighth. The enemy's fire being silenced approaches should be made if practicable across the ravine, and possession so gained of the angle, and the way cleared at the same time for the assault by the Ninth Corps. The mine should not be sprung until all the preparations for an assault are made.
“Ninth. The crest above the enemy's present line may be crowned with batteries by him. Its possession gives the defense great advantage over the attack. If the assault is successful an immediate and vigorous attempt should be made to get possession of the crest. Should it fail the assaulting troops should make good a lodgment as far in advance as practicable, and operations be continued from the salient to get possession of the crest behind it. To do this it will probably be necessary to occupy more ground to our left.
“Tenth. Should these operations offer to the enemy in front of the Eighteenth Corps means of annoyance, which are not at present very apparent, the necessary measures must be taken to overcome them as they develop themselves.
“Eleventh. The advantages of position on the part of the enemy, with the restricted numbers which will prevent our making use of the ground which would envelop him, will make the success of our operations difficult and probably costly, both in time and men.”
<ar82_127> [Indorsement.] “The above project, being in conformity with my views, is approved and adopted. The operations against the salient on the plank road and the battery in front of the Ninth Corps will be at once commenced.
